In the aftermath of the brief but intense May 7–10 “non-contact” war between India and Pakistan, analysts warn that both nations are engaging in increasingly dangerous brinkmanship that could destabilize the region. A detailed assessment published in Dawn by journalist and security analyst Ejaz Haider examines the evolving strategic calculus between the two nuclear-armed neighbours and questions the assumptions underpinning India’s current coercive strategy.
Haider notes that both India and Pakistan claim victory in the four-day conflict, reflecting the different political objectives, tactical narratives, and domestic messaging at play. Neither side delivered a decisive military outcome, but both have drawn strategic lessons that are shaping future policy decisions. The confrontation occurred under the nuclear overhang, which, according to deterrence theory, should have prevented or contained escalation — and in this case, hostilities were limited. However, Haider cautions that India’s approach signals a willingness to push the boundaries of limited conflict under the assumption that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is credible only at the strategic level, leaving space for conventional and sub-conventional operations.
According to Haider, India’s post-2016 strategy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi is defined by a clear policy of “hurting Pakistan in every way,” using both kinetic and non-kinetic means. In his address following the May war, Modi indicated that India’s ‘Operation Sindoor’ had merely been paused, not ended. India’s position that any attack in Indian-occupied Kashmir will be treated as a Pakistani-sponsored act of war, without the need for evidence, effectively creates automaticity in future escalation scenarios. This mirrors the strategic posture often associated with Israel’s self-defence doctrine.
Haider argues that India’s strategy aims to exploit the “stability–instability paradox” — the notion that strategic nuclear parity can paradoxically encourage lower-level conflicts because both sides believe a full-scale war is deterred. India is testing Pakistan’s response thresholds through border skirmishes, sub-conventional activities, and limited strikes, seeking to expand the “band” of acceptable conventional action without triggering a nuclear response.
The May conflict, however, forced India to adjust its calculus after Pakistan launched a successful counter-air operation. India shifted from limited, targeted strikes to engaging Pakistani air defences and air bases, illustrating how escalation can evolve unpredictably. Haider warns that such incremental probing of “firebreaks” between different levels of conflict risks blurring the lines between conventional and nuclear domains.
The article also questions whether coercion can succeed in this context. Drawing on academic research, Haider notes that both India and Pakistan possess near-symmetrical nuclear and conventional capabilities, making successful coercion unlikely. He cites studies by Robert J. Art, Kelly Greenhill, Abby Fanlo, and Lauren Sukin that highlight the difficulty of compelling change through threats in nuclear dyads, regardless of power asymmetries.
Haider emphasizes that deterrence is not a scientific law but a psycho-perceptual process based on signalling, perception, and risk calculation. Misperceptions about thresholds, intentions, and red lines can lead to inadvertent escalation. He draws parallels with historical cases — including the 1962 Sino–Indian border conflict, Pearl Harbor, and U.S. signalling in Vietnam — to illustrate how carefully calibrated signals often fail to achieve their intended effect.
He also highlights Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine, developed in response to India’s Cold Start / Pro-Active Operations (PAO) strategy. FSD aims to deny India a safe space for conventional war by maintaining a credible deterrent across all levels of conflict. India’s repeated limited strikes, however, are testing FSD’s credibility by probing what might actually trigger a nuclear response. Haider warns that India’s misreading of Pakistan’s thresholds could encourage riskier behaviour.
In conclusion, the article argues that India’s inability to compel Pakistan may push it toward increasingly destabilising options, including strategies that risk inadvertent escalation between two nuclear powers. Testing red lines to find space for violence, Haider writes, is “innately unstable because escalation is a step of any size that crosses a saliency.” He cites U.S. political scientist Barry Posen’s warning about causal patterns that can entangle conventional and nuclear forces, leading to catastrophic scenarios.
Pakistan, Haider concludes, must remain prepared to respond to India’s risk-prone strategy without missteps that could escalate the conflict further. The dynamics of deterrence between the two states remain fragile, driven less by scientific predictability and more by perception, signalling, and political calculation.